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FEB 24 1948

MEMORANDUM TO: Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
THROUGH: Assistant Director, Collection and Dissemination
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Intelligence Production Program
REFERENCE: Memorandum, Same Subject as Above, Dated 29 January 1948,
from Executive Director to Assistant Director, ORS

1. In response to the request contained in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, the following answers to paragraph 4 of the attachment thereto are furnished:

a. CIA's intelligence requirements are represented by that information which:

(1) Accurately reflects those foreign political, social, economic, scientific, and military conditions and situations, and changes and developments therein, which effect U. S. security either:

- (a) Independently of U. S. Policy decisions or actions;
- (b) As a result of U. S. Policy decisions or actions; or
- (c) In such manner as to challenge the assumptions upon which previously established U. S. policy or actions appear to have been based.

(2) Is required for the preparation of specialized intelligence estimates for the President, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies engaged in the formulation of foreign policy, and the planning and administration of political, social, economic, psychological, and military action in foreign areas.

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b. The internal production schedule of ORR to meet the intelligence requirements of CIA is based upon the Intelligence Production and Presentation Plan attached hereto marked Enclosure No. 1. The Production Program for the Quarter January through March 1948 is attached hereto marked Enclosure No. 2.


c. The existing interagency agreements to augment:

- (1) CIA's internal production with external material; and
- (2) External requirements with internal production, are set forth in NSCID's No. 1, 2, and 3.

d. The requirements not adequately or satisfactorily met by paragraph 4(b) and (c) of the attachment to the reference are stated as follows:

(1) The ORR Monthly Status Report for January contains a statement regarding the adequacy of intelligence information and intelligence, in which field reporting as well as Washington reporting is discussed and appraised. A copy of this statement is attached hereto marked Enclosure No. 3.

(2) Requirements of policy formulation and operational planning agencies such as the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee, etc. (reference paragraph 1a(2) above), frequently can only be determined from an intelligence production viewpoint by active representation from the research and evaluation levels of the intelligence organization. In this respect, it is believed that CIA representation on committees of such agencies should provide for and maintain the closest possible working-level collaboration and participation.


Deputy Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

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Enclosures (3)

- Encl. No. 1 - Intell. Prod. and Pres. Plan
- Encl. No. 2 - ORR Intell. Prod. Program Quarter Jan. through March 1948
- Encl. No. 3 - Extract from ORR Monthly Status Report - Jan. 1948

cc: Executive Director ✓

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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Operating Procedure 21-48
O.R.E. Instruction No. 29-47

9 July 1947

SUBJECT: Intelligence Production and Presentation Plan

1. The following Intelligence Production and Presentation Plan has been approved by the Director. It should be noted that this is a general plan for use as a guide for the production and presentation of intelligence and is, therefore, susceptible of amendment as circumstances may require.

2. In fulfillment of its mission, the Office of Reports and Estimates will produce or coordinate the production of intelligence in accordance with the following plan.

a. Basic Intelligence. Compile and continuously maintain National Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate.

b. Current Intelligence. Produce and issue:

(1) CIG Daily Summary: A daily summary of significant intelligence and operational information for the President, members of the NIA and limited additional approved distribution.

(2) CIG Weekly Summary: A weekly compendium of concise analyses of significant emergent and current trends, presented in perspective and with consideration of their probable consequences, as a necessary supplement to the Daily and for the same recipients.

(3) CIG Special Evaluations: Concise evaluations, primarily for the recipients of the Daily Summary, of current reports which require treatment at greater length than is possible in the Daily and with greater urgency than is possible in the Weekly, or which otherwise deserve special presentation as current intelligence rather than as Special Reports. Each item in the series shall be restricted to a single topic, and shall include such analysis and interpretation as its urgency permits.

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O.R.E. Instruction No. 29-47

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9 July 1947

c. CIG Staff Intelligence. Produce and issue:

(1) Situation Reports: Analyses of the strategic and national policy aspects of the situation in each significant country or other appropriate geographical area or with respect to significant functional subjects of continuing interest. The items in this series, in their complete form, shall be designed for the use of staff officers below the IAB level, but succinct summaries of their essential contents shall be provided for use at the IAB level and above. Each item will be kept up to date by monthly review and revision as required. With reference to this possible monthly revision, it must be stressed that the series is not intended to become yet another form of current intelligence reporting but rather to consist of up-to-date analyses of the basic factors in the situations reported on.

(2) Special Reports: Analyses prepared by specific direction or in response to a specific authorized request, or on the initiative of ORF as it perceives the occasion in its continuing review of the world situation.

(3) Estimate of the World-Wide Situation: Analysis of the strategic aspects of the world-wide situation as it pertains to U. S. national security. This report is based primarily on the Situation and Special Reports. It is produced semi-annually, or oftener if the situation requires.

*for NSC Meeting
every month?*

d. Oral Presentation. Produce and present:

(1) An oral analysis of significant foreign developments weekly.

(2) Discussions of foreign situations affecting the national security by particularly well qualified observers.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Administrative Memorandum 12-48
~~C.P.E. Operating Procedure 10-48~~

Enc.
No. 2

February 1948

SUBJECT: ORE Intelligence Production Program for the Quarter Ending
1 January 1948 through 31 March 1948

REFERENCE: a. ORE Operating Procedure No. 21-48
b. ORE Operating Procedure No. 24-48

1. Intelligence Production Plan and Procedures

1. Reference a states the general plan for Intelligence Production and Presentation by ORE, as approved by the Director.
2. Reference b delineates the responsibilities of the Staff, Groups, and Branches and outlines the procedures to be followed in the production of intelligence.
3. In implementation of the provisions of the plan given in reference a following the responsibilities and procedures as outlined in reference b, will undertake the following production program for the Quarter 1 January through 31 March 1948:

Basic Intelligence

1. Work on the Defense Project will be continued as a high priority.
2. Every effort will be made to complete this project by 1 March 1948.
3. JANIS Studies. The following list comprises those chapters of JANIS which are estimated for completion on dates indicated:

a. JANIS 312 (Argentina):

Chapters III through VI, VIII, and X through XII have been completed.

Chapter I	March 1948
Chapter II	March 1948
Chapter VII	March 1948
Chapter IX	February 1948
Chapter XIII	March 1948

b. JANIS 41 (Caucasus):

Chapter III has been completed	
Chapter I	September 1948
Chapter II	July 1948
Chapter XII	April 1948
Chapter IV	April 1948
Chapter V	March 1948

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
Deadline for
Completed Draft

Deadline for
Final Dissem.

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c. Staff Intelligence (attachment)

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Current situation in Italy

27 January

16 February

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January
January
February
March
March
March
April
April
May
June
July

February
February
April
May
May
May
June
June
July
August
September

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b. Eastern Europe/USUR Branch

ORE Series:

ORE 9 Succession of Power in the USSR
ORE 80 Communist Activities in Czechoslovakia

Completed
Completed

1 February
15 February


SR Series:

Rumania
Bulgaria
Yugoslavia
Hungary

January
February
March
April
May
June
July

February
April
May
June
July
August
September

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f. Far East/Pacific Branch - SR Series (continued)

[Redacted]
Burma
Pacific Islands
Malaya
Siam

Deadline for
Completed Draft

Deadline for
Final Dissem.

July
August
September
October
September

September
October
November
December
November

g. Global Survey Group

CIA Series:

Review of the World Situation as it Affects
the Security of the United States

3 days before each NSC Meeting Each NSC Meeting

ORE Series:

ORE 46 Effects of Nationalist Movements in Dependent
and Quasi-Dependent Areas on the Foreign
Policy of the Western Powers

15 March

2 April

h. Consultants Panel

(1) International Organizations Panel

ORE Series:

ORE 7A World Federation of Trade Unions

1 April

20 April

(2) Transportation Panel

ORE Series:

ORE 66 [Redacted]
ORE 67 Soviet Military and Civil Aviation Policy
ORE 68 Civil Aviation Policies of Selected Powers

26 January
30 January
5 February

7 February
12 February
20 February

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ENCLOSURE NO. 2

ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

1. Reporting from the Field.

a. Cable Traffic.

During the month of January, approximately 88 per cent of the cables (including reports published by SO, but apparently based on cables received by them) received were from the Department of State. Approximately 10 per cent were from the Department of the Army and the remainder were from the Department of the Navy and the Office of Special Operations. Cables form the basis for most of the production of Current Intelligence, and CIA is therefore primarily dependent upon the Department of State for reporting on the current situation.

b. Field Reports.

Of the written reports upon which the production of CIA Staff Intelligence is largely based, the Department of State supplied the largest volume for the areas covered by the Northern, Near East/Africa, Western Europe, and Latin American Branches. The Department of the Army supplied the largest volume of material from the Far East area

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[redacted] The Army was the second largest contributor in all areas except the Far East where it was the largest contributor.

c. Appraisal.

(1) The information received by ORE from all areas during the month, except the Northern area, was not entirely adequate in quality and in breadth of coverage. Coverage in the Northern area, while variable in quality, was adequate in scope. Information from the Far Eastern, Northern, Western European, and Near East/African areas was adequate in quantity for the topics covered, but the information from the Eastern European/USSR and the Latin American areas was not received in the most desirable quantity in addition to being somewhat short of satisfactory quality and breadth of coverage.

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
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2. Intelligence Coverage by CIA.

While the intelligence produced by ORE on specific situations was qualitatively acceptable, it was necessary to meet the most pressing needs for intelligence on a priority basis without complete coverage of all situations.

3. Intelligence Coverage by the Other IAC Agencies.

a. In general, adequacy of the intelligence produced by the other IAC agencies appears to have varied in direct proportion to the adequacy of reporting on the area concerned.

b. Intelligence coverage of the USSR and its satellites, for example, by the other IAC agencies was not adequate in either quantity or quality. This inadequacy, as well as the inadequacies in ORE coverage on the same area, appears to have been due in part to:

- (1) Soviet security measures which limit reporting from the area;
- (2) Shortage of qualified experts; and
- (3) A possible over-dispersion of such experts as exist.

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